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INTRODUCTION
A major and long-standing focus of scholarly research in international business has been the identification and evaluation of determinants of the location of international production (Dunning, 1993; Caves, 1996) . Most studies in this area attempt to identify and evaluate the most significant determinants of inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI). These empirical studies have generally carried out at the industry and country levels, while concentrating on overall FDI flows witho ut distinguishing different modes of FDI (i.e. 'greenfield' investments or acquisitions).
Highly aggregated FDI, used in virtually all previous empirical studies, resulted in little possibilities to ascertain differences between Dunning's (1993; resource-seeking, market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI.
FDI is alleged to be superior to other forms of external capital inflows. It is argued that FDI will have a more stimulating and long-lasting effect on economic growth because it is less volatile and can provide access to modern technology and know-how. Studies using highly aggregated FDI data, however, have thrown inconclusive evidence on the effects of FDI over economic growth (Caves, 1996) .
Among other things because the potential for transferring technology and know-how is strongly related to the mode of FDI in which industry participants are engaging in FDI (Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2003) .
There are relatively few systematic studies documenting the mode of FDI and specifically looking at cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Ietto-Gillies et al., 2000; Amann and Ferraz, 2002; Evenett, 2003; Golberman and Shapiro, 2004) . This in spite the fact that most FDI has increasingly being is created through cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) . Research in this article identified systematic differences in the trends and directions of Spanish acquisitions in Latin America. These trends reflected strategic decision-making w ith regards to targeted industrial sector and targeted geography while, at the same time, allowed testing for competitive (i.e. ownership specific) advantages in the international expansion and growth of Spanish MNCs. The assessment then provided a basis f or some speculation about the evolution of Spanish firms as multinational corporations.
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The document proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the context explains the emergence and growth of Spanish multinational companies in Latin America during the 1990s. Section 3 details the data set and research methods. In particular this section offers a statistical assessment of trends and directions mergers and acquisitions involving Spanish MNCs in Latin America from an industry, country and individual company perspectives. Section 4 is the final section offering a summary, tentative conclusions and potential for future research.
THE RISE OF THE SPANISH MNC

The Spanish Economy in the 20 th Century
The modern industrialisation of Spain dates to 1959 when the Franco regime abandoned its policy of economic autarky and introduced an economic recovery plan (Harrison, 1985) . This plan also aimed to retake the path of industrialisation, which had abruptly stopped in 1939. The reform of 1959, however, did little to foster growth of entities beyond Spanish borders. By 1970, Spain (together with Portugal) was one of two of the worst performers, in terms of international trade, among Western European countries as it had a rather high level of protection -as measured by an index of estimates of nominal tariff levels for manufacturers (Little et al., 1970) . The return to a democratic government (effective with a new Constitution in 1978) continued with many of the industrial policies of the Franco regime. Although economic policy then successfully articulated a social pact (around the Fuentes Quintana reform of 1977), regulatory changes were unable to withstand the second oil-crisis of 1979 and a deep economic recession ensued -which included the crisis of-and increase concentration in the commercial bank sector. However, the ascension to the European Union (1986) brought about renewed growth with the Spanish economy 'booming' at an average rate of five percent per annum between 1986 and 1990.
Throughout the 1980s and as documented in Salmon (1997), López Duarte and García Canal (2002) and Rodríguez (2002) , trends and directions of investment in Spain were influenced by the globalisation of the world economy (i.e. deepening integration of international commercial and financial activity), ascension to the European Union, and the role of the public sector (increasing Spain's exposure to international markets on the back of European integration and working towards the adoption of a single European currency but, at the same time, pursuing industrial policies of 'national champions').
These trends portray the changing character of the economic environment in the last quarter of the 20 th century resulting in a continuous process of restructuring in the Spanish economy (mediated through structural and regulatory innovations). From 1980 onwards, these trends resulted in Spain (together with Portugal, Greece and Ireland) gradually moving from a position of being overwhelmingly a host country of foreign investment to an intermediate status (Chesnais and Simonetti, 2000, p. 9) .
Although the internationalisation of Spanish firms accelerated during the 1990s, both Tolentino (1993) and Lall (1996) identify Spain as 'late investor'. In other words, given the relative size and growth of Spain's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), there should have been greater stocks of investments abroad than the level observed at the turn of the Millennium. Some arguments traditionally put forward to explain 'late investor' include limited technological capacity, barriers to international trade, low skills, and poor labour mobility. Among others Canals (1991) and Cazorla (1997a, b) identified a lack of financial sources as the main obstacle to the internationalisation of Spanish firms, particularly for small and medium-sized companies which were often marginalised from government support promoting foreign investment. Table 1 illustrates the country distribution of Spanish FDI during the 1990s as measured by highly aggregated data and grouped by members of the élite Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Latin America and the Rest of the World. According to Fernández and Norniella (1998) , a stable macro-economic policy at home and the inclination of Spanish entrepreneurs towards an 'international culture' played an important role in the steep increase of FDI activity at the end of the 1990s.
[Table 1 here]
As measured in nominal prices and as a percentage of total cross-border investments, most Spanish investments abroad aimed at OECD countries and Latin America, with a sharp fall in that oriented to the rest of the world since 1995. Trends in Table 1 shows that Spanish FDI in Latin America peaked in 1999 at 35,504 million euros (57% of total Spanish FDI for that year). Trends in Table 1 were consistent with systematic analysis by Ietto-Gilles et al. (2000, p. 60) , which documented evidence of 6 Spanish FDI (together with that of Portugal and Greece) observing a preference for global links rather than greater integration within the European Union (EU). This was indeed surprising given the Spanish government's policies promoting greater integration with European markets and creating Spanish 'national champions' -entities expected to do well in European markets.
[ Figure 1 around here] Data emerging from cross border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions were consistent with trends described by highly a ggregated data. A focus on acquisitions as mode of international expansion assumes that the acquiring firm perceives greater net benefits from internalising foreign production rather than engaging through open markets or licence the right to do so (Dunning, 2000) . Data on cross border M&A has the added advantage of giving insights to the market for corporate control. For instance, the possibility that FDI investments pursued more than production facilities and sought non-tangible assets (such as brand names, management skills and Succinctly, growth of Spanish MNCs in Latin America through cross boder acquisitions is an interesting phenomenon and one in need of systematic attention.
Spanish trade in that region involved relocating non-trivial quantities of resources. For individual entities this processes represented the greatest level of internationalisation.
Anecdotal evidence of trends and directions in aggregate flows of Spanish FDI into
Latin America would suggest that the competitive advantage of Spanish entities abroad is different from that at home, pointing to the need of examining the sources of competitive advantage for the Spanish MNC. However, inferences on FDI decisions from highly aggregated data risks biased results because aggregate data offers little 7 insights as to who owned the assets, who undertook the investments or what was the motivation to pursue such investments.
Latin America at the End of the 20 th Century
Whereas Spanish entities have been grouped together with those of France, Italy, Portugal and Belgium in a cluster of 'Latin European' countries (Ronen and Shenkar, 1985) , those in Spanish speaking America have been grouped in a related but somewhat different cluster. With the exception of Brazil, which was considered an 'independent', and the Guyanas; entities in continental Central and South American economies have been grouped into a Latin American cluster, that is, grouped into a meaningful category based on shared features such as geography, language, religion and management practice (idem).
By 1970 a widespread policy of industrialisation and substitution of imports for local products implemented in the decades that followed the Second World War resulted in many Latin American countries observing a level of protection that surpassed that of Spain -as measured by an index of estimates of nominal tariff levels for manufacturers (Little et al., 1970) . An increasingly protectionist stand did not preclude, however, the entry of multinational companies from the US (e.g. Coca Cola, Procter and Gamble), Europe (e.g. Glaxo, Volkswagen, Danone, Phillips) and Japan (e.g. Sony, Honda, Nissan) into Latin American countries. During the 1970s many Latin American countries benefited from high i nternational commodity prices. Economic growth rocketed for the likes of Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil, which had been endowed with considerable oil reserves as ever increasing oil prices meant increasing revenues for oil producing countries. Unable to invest all the oil revenues at home, countries such as Venezuela, Nigeria and Kuwait made large deposits in international banks. A number of international banks found themselves sitting on large pools of money looking for a 'home', which they found by lending to governments and large corporations in emerging markets such as Mexico. At the time, the prospect of higher rates of economic growth on the back of rising commodity prices (particularly in oil producing countries) suggested there were attractive growth opportunities for entities located in Mexico and Latin America. Trade protection and in particular cumbersome procedures for FDI suggested local entities had greater chance of success in capturing those growth opportunities than foreign firms. Thus, it seemed a good idea for local entities in Latin America to get indebted. The problem was that this was overwhelmingly short-term debt (i.e. with maturity of less than a year).
The price of oil collapsed when the main oil producing countries failed to reach a production agreement. This came on the back of economic recession in many industrialised countries and the subsequent drop in international commodity prices due to the lack of demand. Many Latin American countries then did not have enough money to service its foreign debt. As an alternative to withholding all payments, in August 1982 the Mexican government requested international debtors to reschedule the commitments of state and private companies. Other measures involved the nationalisation of the private banking system, a major devaluation of the currency and the setting up of strict exchange controls. A preferential exchange rate was set for imports and payments of international claims. Another rate (50% above the preferential rate) was set for exports, tourism and repayment, to Mexican retail clients, of deposits in sources such as the US, Japan and Western European countries. However, by 1995 regulatory changes in most Latin American countries had resulted in extensive privatisation of public enterprises and substantial investments from firms whose headquarters were established outside that region (for instance R. La Porta and Lòpez de Silanes, 1999; Love and Lage-Hidalgo, 1999a; 1999b; Calderòn et al., 2002; Len et al., 2002) .
In summary, the 'lost decade' of the 1980's lowered the overall attractiveness of Latin America as a destination for cross-border investments. Multinational corporations (MNC) based in countries with high FDI stock in the region (i.e. the US, Japan and Western European countries such as UK, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) in many cases completely withdrew their operations and even refused to work through agents or licensing agreements. Some sectors and in particular international financial services were unwilling or unable to capture opportunities within the region. Thereby, key players that otherwise would have competed against the Spanish MNC (such as the banks) were totally absent.
Trends and Directions of Spanish Acquisitions in Latin America
Figure 2 summarises the sector distribution of Spanish investment in Latin
America during the 1990s. Investments in financial services (41% of total) and utilities (namely transport and communications at 36%) stand out from investments made in other sectors. Targets of Spanish foreign operations in Latin America during the 1990s were quite different from economic activity in Spain, whose exports were dominated by tourism, textiles and apparel (including footwear), agri-business, machine tools, medical equipment, shipbuilding, clay and refractory products. Sector distribution of FDI during the 1990s also showed marked differences with cross-border growth of Spanish manufacturing during the 1980s as documented by Nohria and García Pont (1991) , Rubalcaba and Gago (2001) and Bajo Rubio and López Pueyo (2002). At an international level, growth of Spanish financial service MNC's was atypical. Similar organisations in other OECD countries (and particularly for US-based banks) usually 'lagged' rather than 'lead' manufacturing firms in their degree of internationalisation (Tschoegl, 1987; Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001; Tschoegl, 2002) .
Moreover, data for US companies supported the idea that banks and other financial organisations 'followed' manufacturers outside the US, and while financial services firms may not locate in the same country they would establish in the same region (see further von der Ruhr, 2000) . However, the 'debt crisis' of the 1980s resulted in a number of financial institutions in the US and Western Europe unwilling or unable to grow across borders while Japanese banks also abandoned the international scene thanks to a long-running recession in their home markets during the 1990s. As a result, between 1980 and 1990 there was greater integration of international financial markets thanks to technological developments rather than through the geographic diversification of banks. Table 2 suggested Spanish MNC activity in Latin America could have been the result of a handful of companies as by financial services and utilities stand out from investments made by other sectors. However, an average value per transaction of US$426 million for all 228 transactions (with details regarding the transaction's value) suggested that, although most Spanish firms had been involved in six or less transactions, M&A activity between 1987 and 2001 distributed throughout a broad range of sectors. This was corroborated in Table 2 which shows Spanish firms sought equity control in their cross-border growth although the size of individual investments was wide ranging (from US$18 million to US$1,420 million).
[Table 2 here]
Trends and directions of Spanish in cross-border M&A in Figure 1 and Table 2 would suggest that there was a preference for a reduced number of sectors in a limited number of countries, concentration which did not seem to have played at the strengths of the home country and which suggested that the competitive advantage of Spanish firms abroad was different to that at home. Under the light of not playing on home country strengths, growth of the Spanish MNC through acquisition would suggest that Spanish multinationals were driven by the search of new market opportunities (such as unsatisfied demand abroad) or responding an excess installed capacity in Spain.
However, the emergence of the Spanish MNC was embedded in a more complex setting. Specifically, the atypical geographical (i.e. Latin America) and sector (i.e. predominance of banking and utilities) distribution of Spanish cross border investments responded to the inability (and unwillingness) of MNCs from the so-called 'Triad' countries (US, Japan and Western Europe) to increase their stocks of FDI in Latin America. Some sectors where Spanish MNCs were absent in Latin America (such as consumer goods and pharmaceuticals) were part of the global dominance of MNCs based 'Triad' countries and this dominance also helps explaining geographic and sector concentration of Spanish acquisitions in Latin America. However, along side the apparent concentration of Spanish acquisitions in Latin America being limited to a few countries and few markets, trends in cross border mergers and acquisitions involving Spanish firms also suggested there were significant investments in Latin America by Spanish MNC, which went beyond utilities and banking. For instance, there were significant investments in many other areas such as railroads, road construction, oil and gas, etc. In the following section these trends are reassessed to examine the statistical significance of the determinants of FDI investment decisions. In this process, the analysis will shed light as to whether the competitive advantage of Spanish firms in Latin America was different from that at home and the extent to which these decisions responded to Dunning's (1993; resource-seeking, market-seeking and efficiencyseeking FDI as measured by market size (M ij ), wage effects (W ij ) and 'cultural affinity' (C ij ).
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Analysis Framework
Assessing the determinants of individual FDI decisions ( S n ) is still full of challenges and an area worthy of attention. Empirical research is inconclusive as to the links between international diversification and superior financial performance (Palich, 12 Cardinal et al., 2000; Palich, Carini et al., 2000; Martin and Sayrak, 2003) while debate also prevails as to the accuracy of constructs to measure international diversification (Nayvar, 1992; Sambharya, 2000; Hyland and Diltz, 2002) . The nature of FDI decisions also grew in complexity when, as a result of changes in the world economy during the last quarter of the 20 th century, multinational corporations (MNC) were encouraged to expand into emerging economies (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Luo, 2001; Amann and Ferraz, 2002; Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2003) . Emerging markets were perceived to offer significant growth opportunities for MNCs as inefficient markets for corporate control in less developed countries suggested there were opportunities for a foreign buyer to pay a price not fully reflecting the prospects of a new unit. Indeed, entities from countries lower down the technological ladder can develop transferable advantages relative to firms (existing or potential) in even less developed countries since the former could benefit from advantages associated to a more advanced stage of development and industrialisation (Hu, 1995, p. 84) . Possibilities to exploit market-value and operational differences emerge as in less developed countries large companies are few, financial resources are less abundant and professional management is scarce (Porter, 1987, pp. 49 and 52; Hu, 1995, pp. 84-5) .
Growth into emerging markets, however, could poise strategic questions that established frameworks could not resolve (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Dharwadkar et al., 2000) and hence attraction of looking at individual decisions of FDI through acquisition. Namely, the potential to learn more about who owns the assets, who is making the investments or what is the motivation to pursue such investments. As mentioned above, the assessment of FDI acquisition decisions is often based on aggregate data and fieldwork typically assumed that all firms in one country and/or in one industry were equally likely grow across borders and for similar reasons.
The research that follows compares and contrasts individual and aggregate MNC behaviour. FDI acquisition decisions into less developed countries were explored by looking at the interaction between idiosyncratic elements of individual transactions (s n ) with demand (M ij ), wage (W ij ) cultural affinity (C ij ) effects. Year. J Country.
It is worth noting that empirical research around FDI decisions into less developed countries has emphasised cross-border growth into Asian economies (e.g. Chen and Chen, 1998; Luo, 2001; Makino et al., 2002; Wong and Ellis, 2002) , former communist countries in Eastern Europe (e.g. Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 2000; Buck et al., 2001; Beyer, 2002; Meyer, 2002) or US investments in Latin America (e.g. Grosse, 1992; Love and Lage-Hidalgo, 1999a; 1999b; Len et al., 2002) . As a result, a neglected area of research has been to consider and explore diversification decisions of 
The Data Set
Since the late 1980s and by the mid-1990s three quarters of the world's FDI took the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Given that only a quarter of world-wide cross-border growth takes the form of new ('greenfield') investment, one could take the view that FDI pertains more to changes in the ownership of capital and to industrial restructuring than to the accumulation of capital (Chesnais and Simonetti, 2000, p. 5) .
This is consistent with the view by Kogut (1983; , Buckley and Casson (1998) . For this reason the assessment initially moved forward using only the number of deals to test for unrelated diversification while the value of deals was used when different patterns emerged (more below).
Data was also available for the share of total equity owned after individual transactions (399 transactions or 87% of total). Using ownership data, 26 transactions were excluded from the total. This to consider transactions where the Spanish firm had purchased more than 10% of equity (i.e. 'capital social' 4 ). Excluding transactions of 9.99% or less allowed distinguishing between investments leading to or creating 'options to expand' from simple financial investments. There were 96 transactions with no data regarding per cent owned after acquisition and these were also excluded. As a result, the assessment moved forward using data for 337 transactions when assessing the number of deals (while testing for related/unrelated diversification) and 228 transactions when assessing the value of the deals (while testing for trends and directions of crossborder acquisitions).
Empirical Model
The data set on individual transactions was sorted to include specific characteristics of each country and year to form a panel as specified in model 1 above.
This database was the basis to proceed with the empirical assessment of the value of FDI decisions (S n ). These decisions were measured by the proportion of the value of an individual transaction in Latin America represented in the total annual value of crossborder transactions where Spain had been the country of the acquiring firm.
The interaction of financial characteristics of individual transactions (s n ) and the effects of demand (M ij ), wage (W ij ) and cultural affinity (C ij ) constructs was tested to instance, companies such as IBM generated over 40% of income from services in 2001 yet the parentcompany's main line of activities was classified under hardware manufacturing. This bias against service industries is, perhaps, mitigated by the fact that industry classification of the deal refers to the unit whose ownership has been transferred rather than to the whole group (i.e. the parent company). investigate systematic differences between trends and directions of FDI decisions using aggregate and individual transaction data. A total of 110 constructs were used in assessing determinants of the value of individual FDI decisions, S n UNCTAD, 1992; R. La Porta et al., 1998; CEPAL, 2000; OIT, 2002; SDC, 2002; Euromoney, 2003) . These constructs are not presented for brevity but are available from the corresponding author. Succinctly, 39 different constructs (35%)
provided details as to the financial characteristics (s n ) of each and every one of the 228 transactions were the financial value was available for acquisitions involving Spanish MNCs in Latin America. There were 16 constructs (15%) dealing with terms of trade and 'degree of openness' were identified as potential measures of market size (M ij ). Six constructs (5%) considered relative income measures and an index for the intensity of union militancy throughout the work force and were identified as potential measures wage effects (W ij ). Eight constructs (7%) considered trends and directions of M&A activity (τ i-1 ) and thus accounted for issues such as 'herd effects', growth in the stock of FDI and a reduction in the number of potentially suitable acquisition targets.
Instrumental variables were added to identify transactions involving the most active companies as described in Table 1 and Figure 3 (δ 1 ). Another variable modelled the main recipients of Spanish FDI in terms of number of transactions as described in Figure 2 (δ 2 ). There were eleven instrumental variables (10%) as specified below.
Cultural compatibility has increasingly been sought to provide an explanation as to why domestic and cross-border acquisitions succeed or fail (e.g. Kogut and Singh, 1988 ; Gomez-Mejia and Palich, 1997) . While favourable financial statements or product synergy may be the initial attraction to an acquisition candidate, it has increasingly been argued that whether an acquisition actually works may have more to do with how well the two organisations' 'cultures' match up. Data to assess 'cultural affinity' (C ij ) included dimensions external and external to individual entities. External to the organisation, it was important to model the m arket for corporate control. In particular, 26 (24%) constructs were identified to represent the rights granted to the shareholders by the legal environment as well as the effectiveness of the judiciary to uphold these rights (R. La Porta et al., 1998) . Dimensions which seem to have been critical to explain growth of MNCs in some Latin American countries (R. La Porta and Lòpez de Silanes, 1999) .
At the same time, the internal environment was represented by difference between the rank of Spain and the rank of each individual county as scored in Hofstede's (1991) four indexes of national culture (4%). Stylised features of corporate culture such as those emerging from grounded work by Hofstede are not without critics (Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1997; H ennart and Larimo, 1998; McSweeney, 2002; Baskerville, 2003) . However, these indexes have been used extensively in empirical research as measures of national culture and explanations of the interaction between national culture and management (Hofstede, 2002; Williamson, 2002) . As a result, the empirical assessment of the 'cultural affinity' construct ( C ij ) assumed differences between countries were greater than differences between different organisations or differences between organisations in the same industry or sector. America. In this matrix related diversification was measured by the elements on the main diagonal (that is, TO the same SIC code as FROM the same SIC code). Unrelated diversification was measured by the off-diagonal elements. Cohen's kappa was used as measure of dispersion from the main diagonal (Wilcox, 1996) and an estimate of k = 0.52 suggested there was more than chance agreement for related diversification of cross-border activity.
Sector Level Analysis
To identify sectors where unrelated diversification was statistically significant, the matrix with M &A flows was compared with another matrix that considered ´theoretical´ frequencies that would appear in the absence of any particular strong link between two sectors. The matrix with expected flows represented the number of transactions between a two digit SIC code in Latin America and a two digit code in Spain that would occur in the absence of any factors that would favour particular participation, direct or indirect, is equal or superior to 10% of the social capital". relationships (i.e. particularly high or particularly low) between any one pair of two digit codes. The matrix for actual flows and the matrix for ´theoretical´ flows were compared using an indicators based on the chi-squared, namely America were active but only one was statistically significant. Table 3 summarises these results.
[ [ Table 4 here]
Succinctly, in order to investigate the pattern of foreign investment through cross-border M&A, a matrix was created examining the flow of M&A (number of deals) between pairs of industries (as measured by two digit SIC codes). The aim was to asses whether trends in M&A transactions could help in ascertain links between M&A activity and the competitive advantage of Spanish firms in Latin America. As suggested by descriptive evidence in the previous, an approximation using Cohen's kappa and χ 2 suggested that foreign investment of Spanish MNC´s in Latin America during the 1990s was heterogeneous and concentrated in a few industries. These tests, however, were unable to tell whether related diversification associated with the successful transfer of competencies, market opportunities and accessing resources to supply foreign markets.
In the following section an assessment is made as to the growth of Spanish MNCs in Latin America in terms of market opportunities and environmental risk
Country Level Analysis
A second statistical test looked at the empirical significance of model 1 above through a regression model, namely S n = α j + Σ n β n j (s n , M ij ,W ij , C j , τ i-1j ) + Σ m β m j δ j + φ AR(9) + ε n The 110 constructs identified as potential determinants of the value of individual FDI decisions (S n ) were reduced to 22 constructs. See Table 5 . Firstly, pre-regression test used cross sections by year (1999 and 2001) as well as countries (Argentina and Colombia) and found 28 construc ts were unable to contribute to the assessment. 7 For instance, most of the details as to the financial characteristics of the transaction (s n ) were lost as these constructs overwhelmingly had a value of zero. Other constructs and notably wage effect characteristics (W ij ) as well as differences in the culture of the market for corporate control (C j ), were found to contribute little in the way of explaining the value of individual cross-border transactions. Secondly, during test for linear correlation, loss of constructs came about in order to avoid the potential spurious relation between some of them (i.e. multicolinearity) as the model had to be corrected for autocorrelation and heterocedasticity.
[ Table 5 
here]
As a result of the careful screening, 11 constructs (50%) provided details as to the financial characteristics of the transactions (s n ). There were six constructs (27%) 21 dealing with terms of trade and degree of openness. These had been identified as potential measures of market size (M ij ). Two constructs (9%) represented measures of national culture (C ij ). Two constructs (9%) considered trends and directions of M&A activity ( τ i-1 ). One instrumental variable (5%) was added to identify transactions involving the most active companies (i.e. utilities) as described in Table 2 above (δ 1 ).
No-one constructs identified as potential measures wage effects (W ij ) was found to have had statistically significant or making a contribution to the best explanatory model.
Results suggested Spanish MNCs were happy to accommodate the institutional environment in Latin America provided there was certainty shareholder rights would be protected and country risk was perceived to be relatively low. Cultural affinity constructs were important but only two were statistically significant to explain differences in valuation. The latter pointed to a common cultural heritage between Spain and Latin America. Specifically, a small difference between Spain's and the host country's power distance index suggests Spanish MNC seemed to prefer countries (and companies) where there was a perception of a paternalistic style of management. Taken together with the relative importance of the masculinity index (i.e. same degree of gender differentiation) forceful argument could be made that, in such a context, the importance of interpersonal trust is high.
At the same time the propensity for unions to influence negotiations and the potential value of an acquisition was important but again, not statistically significant.
The instrumental variable for privatisation was no statistically significant at the 1% level. Instead the number of potential candidates for acquisition was seen as more important. Together these effects pointed to the importance of changes in economic policies of Latin American governments as source for the emergence of the Spanish MNC. Privatisation was instrumental in developing local stock markets and allowed exploiting market-value differences in less developed countries (Porter, 1987, pp. 49 and 52; Hu, 1995, pp. 84-5) . Privatizations, therefore, were a welcomed invitation for making expansion into foreign markets through acquisition attractive. 7 Not shown for brevity but available from the corresponding author.
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Absence of constructs r elated to wage effect suggested that neither greater efficiency nor the construction of an international platform (in the sense of increased global value integration) were a prime reason to explain internationalisation of Spanish entities. Rather than resource seeking or efficiency seeking, results from the econometric model suggested the strategies of Spanish firms responded to market seeking, that is, demand oriented FDI. Results suggesting a preference by Spanish firm in gaining access to foreign markets rather than an attempt to create global export platforms were consistent with those of Amman and Ferraz (2002) and Nachum, Jones et al. (2001) . Market seeking strategies could well have resulted from the desire to satisfy unmet demand in foreign markets (e.g. utilities) or because of an excess supply in home markets (e.g. depositary institutions). The drive to increase demand for existing products and services was evident in that market seeking measures (M ij ) had the greatest number of statistically significant constructs (that is, after considering financial constructs or those related to the potential to pay a premium for the target company).
Statistical significance of trend constructs suggested not all partners in Latin
America were equally desirable. The greater the number of transaction for a single country in the same industry significantly reduced the number of potential acquisition targets. In combination with financial constructs (these been the greatest in number for the final model) suggested Spanish MNC were unwilling to pay a premium or enter a market through acquisition at "which ever the cost". Spanish MNC were ready to pay "fair price" for their interest in (some or all) the assets. Otherwise would enter through a different mode (such as greenfield investments, export or licensing).
CONCLUSIONS
Links between Spanish and Latin America have a long history as Spanish FDI in the region dates to the 16 th and 17 th centuries. More recently, during the 1990s there was an important re-emergence of Spanish investments in the region. However, Spain's investments in Latin America during the 1990's cannot be examined without looking into what preceded such investments. That is to say, the 'lost decade' of the 1980's lowered the overall attractiveness of the region. Multinational companies based in so called 'Triad' countries had the highest stock of FDI in the region but, at the time, were unwilling or unable to increase their investments. In particular, financial service organisations retreated from international markets while dealing with debt renegotiation.
Thereby, key players that otherwise would have competed against the Spanish banks were totally absent. Spanish bankers lead the investment process not only through their financial operations, but through their (controlled) subsidiaries in key countries.
Trends and directions of aggregate FDI flows of Spanish investments into Latin
America suggested that the competitive advantage of Spanish entities abroad was different from that at home. There was a marked concentration in some countries and Suggesting that the comparative (i.e. owner specific) advantages of the Spanish firm are not absolute, that is, so as to out bid any other actual or potential competitor in international markets (as required by Porter, 1987) but sufficient to be superior to organisational forms found in Latin America (see further Hu, 1995; Dunning, 2000 ).
An econometric model explored measures of market size effect, wage effects, 'cultural affinity', overall trend (i.e. 'herd' effect) and financial dimensions unique to the transaction. Most financial dimension were statistically significant, many trend and cultural variables were discarded but at least two of each remained, as did constructs related to market (i.e. demand) effects, while and wage effects were discarded. The most (statistically) significant variables in the most parsimonious estimation of the econometric model included the mode of acquisition, the rank of the target country exports to Spain in Spain's imports, country risk, Hofstede's (1991) power distance index and the growth rate in the overall number for cross-border transactions for that country. All this suggested that buying into the right market was as important as acquiring the right target at a 'fair price'. Econometric results were consistent with poorly developed financial markets and a strong preference of Spanish MNCs to acquire control (i.e. average ownership after transaction equal to 67%). The analysis of the growth of Spanish firms in Latin America also highlights the advantages of privatisation to strengthen product and market positions rather than attempting to create global export platforms.
The emergence of the Spanish MNC, as reported in this article, takes place during a period of heighten cross-border activity and in particular changed competition in global markets for financial service organisations. However, there are limitations to generalise on the effects of globalisation based on the last wave of cross-border activity behaviour (see further Evenett, 2003) . Nevertheless, the nature and intent behind Spanish acquisitions in Latin America is topic that still requires attention. In particular, documenting systematic differences between sectors involving a few transactions and those involving a large number of transactions. Chemicals and allied products (SIC 28) 
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